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Abstract: 
The debate about the future of the death penalty often focuses on whether its supporters 
are animated by instrumental or expressive values, and if the latter, what values the 
penalty does in fact express, where those values originated, and how deeply entrenched 
they are. In this article I argue that a more explicit recognition of the emotional sources of 
support for and opposition to the death penalty will have salutary consequences for the 
clarity of the debate. The focus on emotional variables reveals that the demarcation 
between instrumental and expressive values is porous; both types of values are informed 
(or uninformed) by fear, outrage, compassion, selective empathy and other emotional 
attitudes. More fundamentally, though history, culture and politics are essential aspects of 
the discussion, the resilience of the death penalty cannot be adequately understood when 
the affect is stripped from explanations for its support. Ultimately, the death penalty will 
not die without a societal change of heart. 
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The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence 
of the American Death Penalty 
 
Susan Bandes* 
 
 Before we can predict the fate of the death penalty, we need to understand why 
capital punishment has persisted for so long in the United States. Why have we continued 
to execute people into the twenty-first century, despite evidence of wrongful executions, 
a lack of hard evidence of the penalty’s efficacy, and the increasing isolation of our 
position in the industrialized world?  The explanations for this persistence ought to 
provide insight into the question of whether the death penalty is dying. Unfortunately, the 
conventional discourse on this topic fails to adequately address one essential aspect of the 
death penalty’s tenacity. As I will argue, the persistence of the death penalty is 
incomprehensible without addressing the role of emotion. 
 The conventional discourse about capital punishment proceeds along certain well-
established, highly circumscribed paths. In general, it tracks the usual philosophical 
debate about the purposes of punishment. The traditional assumption is that capital 
punishment must serve an instrumental goal: deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation. 
More recently, the notion that capital punishment might serve goals that are expressive in 
nature has gained currency. Questions about racial bias and systemic error are 
                                                 
* Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul College of Law. I wish to thank Austin Sarat for inviting me to 
write this article, and Joe Rollins and Scott Sundby for valuable comments on earlier drafts. I am also 
grateful to the faculty of New York Law School, and particularly Robert Blecker, and the faculty of Temple 
Law School, and particularly Peter Huang, Eleanor Myers, Muriel Morisey and Mark Rahdert, for their 
collegiality and their incisive comments on this paper. Finally, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for 
very helpful comments. 
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counterpoised against these basic rationales, so that the question becomes whether these 
problems with the system outweigh or detract from the penalty’s penalogical goals. This 
is the shape of the legal and philosophical debate about whether the death penalty is 
justified. It is also the outward face of the public debate about the death penalty, since 
that debate is often framed and summarized by social scientists and pollsters whose 
questions track the traditional discourse (Ellsworth and Gross 1994).1 
 The rather salient emotional content of the question of whether or when the state 
should kill is generally treated as a vexing and improper detour from the rigors of proper 
legal analysis or the scope of legitimate debate. This attitude toward emotion—a 
combination of denigration and denial-- shapes both the debate about whether capital 
punishment should be maintained as a legitimate punishment, and the debate about who 
should be executed. It creates a two-track discussion, in which one track is regarded as 
legally grounded, rigorous and acceptable, the other as illegitimate; not part of the 
accepted legal language or structure. The result is deleterious on two interrelated counts.  
 First, the “legally grounded” discussion, with its reference to time-honored but 
affectless concepts like “deterrence” and “incapacitation,” fails to describe with any 
accuracy the way people actually arrive at decisions about the death penalty. The official 
“reasons” for the death penalty have only a tenuous connection to the real reasons why 
people support capital punishment. Researchers asking people why they support the death 
penalty repeatedly conclude that “most people’s attitudes toward capital punishment are 
basically emotional. The ‘reasons’ are determined by the attitude, not the reverse.” 
(Ellsworth and Gross 1994: 95). 
                                                 
1 Moreover, the public opinion data is then cited in court opinions seeking to measure community attitudes. 
(Haney 2005 at 78, discussing Furman, in which public opinion was discussed in five of the Justices’ nine 
separate opinions.) 
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 Second, the official discourse, as currently structured, perpetuates a misleading 
and problematic normative assumption: that the official reasons are devoid of emotion 
(except, perhaps, for a few carefully managed, “allowable” emotions). Capital 
punishment discourse too often operates on the assumption that rigorous, non-emotional 
reasons for or against the death penalty exist, but that the conversation keeps getting 
hijacked by unruly passion. I suggest that the reasons themselves, both the so-called 
instrumental reasons and the so-called expressive reasons, are imbued with emotional 
content. The demarcation between instrumental and expressive values is porous, and at 
bottom, both types of values are informed (or uninformed) by fear, outrage, compassion, 
selective empathy and other emotional attitudes. Or to put it another way, the decision 
whether or not  to maintain and implement our system of capital punishment is inherently 
an expressive decision; one which is both inescapably moral and inescapably emotional. 
The official discourse masks, sanitizes or denigrates much of this emotional content. The 
result is not to banish emotion from the system, but to drive discussion of it underground, 
to privilege certain emotions, and to perpetuate a system that depends on moral and 
emotional distance and even disengagement. 
 The Court’s approach in California v. Brown (1986), in which it upheld a jury 
instruction cautioning the jury that it “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling,” illustrates its misplaced 
faith in the existence of an emotionless realm and how it privileges certain emotions. 
(Brown 1986: 540) The Court was confident that jurors would understand this instruction 
as a prohibition on the exercise of “mere” or “untethered” sympathy, and would 
understand that they were still permitted to exercise mercy or compassion. Justice 
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O’Connor, in her concurrence, explained that the instruction properly recognized the 
jury’s decision as “a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, and not an 
emotional response to the mitigating evidence.” (Brown (1986: 545) Even apart from the 
question of how juries are to distinguish sympathy, mere sympathy, mercy and 
compassion, the larger point is that the Court mistakes the nature of moral decision-
making. Whether a juror votes to take or spare a life will depend in large part on 
empathy, distancing, anger, blame and other emotional variables; and these variables will 
constitute an essential component of his moral decision (Haney 1997; Sundby. 2005). 
When the juror tries in good faith to fit these moral and emotional reactions into a legal 
framework, he will often conclude that he has been instructed to put his empathy for the 
defendant “aside.” Because he has received no explicit instruction about anger, outrage, 
distancing, and even disgust, and has usually received both explicit2 and implicit 
messages that these states do not count as inappropriate or emotional, he is likely to 
conclude that they fit comfortably within the legal framework.3  
  Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Furman v. Georgia (1974), in which he “ignored 
the advice” Chief Justice Burger had given him “not to wear his heart on his sleeve,” 
(Greenhouse 2005: 114) captures the determined struggle to “rise above” emotion in 
determining whether capital punishment is appropriate: 
                                                 
2 For example, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Saffle v. Parks, in which the jury had received an anti-sympathy 
instruction, quotes the prosecutor’s language at length. At voir dire, in commenting on the instruction, the 
prosecutor told the jury, “And that’s just as cold-blooded as you can put it…You can be as sympathetic as 
you want to…but you can’t do it and sit on this jury.” In his closing argument he said, among other similar 
comments, “You’re not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death. You just have become a part of the criminal 
justice system that says when anyone does this, that he must suffer death. So all you are doing is you’re just 
following the law….it’s not on your conscience…God’s law is the very same…So don’t let it bother your 
conscience, you know.” 494 U.S. 1257, 1272-73 n13 (1990). 
3 See generally Craig Haney’s book, Death by Design, for discussion of the many ways in which the capital 
punishment system is structured to create distance from the moral and emotional dimensions of the 
decision. As Scott Sundby observed, aggravating factors like ‘especially heinous” or “vile” give the jurors 
arguing for a death sentence a “legal” factor that they can point to and say “see the law requires this—it is 
right here on the verdict form.” Letter from Scott Sundby to Susan Bandes, August 8, 2006.  
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Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield 
to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence for 
the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral 
judgment exercised by finite minds...[A]lthough personally I may rejoice at 
the Court’s result, I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of 
history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. (Furman 1974:  414) 
 
Ultimately, Justice Blackmun came to realize that the legal issues could not be neatly 
cabined in this way. In Callins v. Collins, he famously declined to continue to “tinker 
with the machinery of death” (Callins 1994:1145). His passionate description of an 
execution4 bespeaks a man who has long tried to grapple with capital punishment through 
the legal lens, but who can no longer distance himself from the fact that the death penalty 
involves the killing of a human being, and that the propriety of this state-sponsored 
killing is, at its crux, a moral and emotional question. 
 My contention is that the standard discussion about why we continue to execute—
in the courts and the public forum-- fails, to its great detriment, to engage the crucial role 
of emotion. It treats emotion as an optional and indeed unwelcome commodity—the heart 
on the sleeve. It assumes a division between the “proper” or “acceptable” reasons to 
support or oppose the death penalty, and the emotional reaction that is viewed as the 
abdication of reasoning.  
 I will argue, to the contrary, that emotion is deeply involved in legal and moral 
judgment, in ways that are not optional or severable. Emotion affects how we interpret 
facts, categorize, discern patterns, identify norms and deviations from norms, and choose 
and prioritize among available options. It affects how we form our attitudes, values and 
                                                 
4 “The witnesses…will behold Callins, no longer a defendant, an appellant, or a petitioner, but a man, 
strapped to a gurney, and seconds away from extinction.” 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994). 
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beliefs, and how, once they are formed, we approach challenges to them. It affects what 
we find important, and what stirs us to action. 
 The standard discussion makes another important mistake about the nature of 
emotion: that it is private and internal. Emotion theory has become increasingly 
cognizant of the importance of understanding how emotions are affected by social 
interaction, and, in turn, how they affect societal notions of moral and ethical judgment 
(Haidt 2001).  When emotion is approached as interactional, rather than merely private 
and internal, its study sheds light on the nature of legal institutions: both on how 
institutions channel, encourage and even help shape our emotions, and on how the 
institutions in turn reflect the social and ethical value judgments those emotions help to 
shape.  
 This article will begin by recounting the traditional rationales for the death 
penalty and raising some questions about their content and limitations. It will then discuss 
the essential role of emotion in every aspect of the death penalty system—its formation, 
its definition, its maintenance and its persistence. Finally, it will explore the implications 
of emotion’s role for the question at hand: whether the death penalty is dying. 
The Traditional Rationales Revisited 
 The standard arguments for capital punishment, familiar to any first year law 
student, are first, that it will deter others from committing similar crimes, second, that it 
is retributive in nature, meting out just deserts for the crime committed, and third, that it 
will permanently incapacitate the defendant so he cannot commit further crimes.5 These 
                                                 
5 This is the theory of general deterrence. The theory of specific deterrence differs: it refers to the ability of 
punishment to deter the particular defendant from committing other crimes. There is some ambiguity in the 
literature as to the use of the terms “specific deterrence” and “incapacitation.” Execution seems better 
described as incapacitating, in that it makes it impossible for the defendant to commit more crimes, rather 
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penological theories are the subject of longstanding arguments which draw, implicitly 
and explicitly, from several types of authority. Deterrence arguments are viewed as 
utilitarian in nature, (Carter and Kreitzberg 2004), and thus based, at least implicitly, on 
empirical psychological assumptions about how people make decisions. Retributive 
theory, with its reference to what is morally right and deserved, is essentially non-
empirical6 (Radelet and Borg 2000). It is philosophically, and even theologically, 
based—for example, in its use of the lex talionis as a proper yardstick (Owens and 
Elshtain 2004: 4). However, retributive theory has undergone a shift, more recently 
drawing on psychologically based assumptions about the importance of punishment—and 
of participation in the sentencing process-- to victims and, in capital cases, to their loved 
ones. (Zimring 2003, Sarat 2001, Bandes 1996). Incapacitation arguments are harder to 
characterize, particularly in the capital context: they sound utilitarian (some murderers 
must be executed to prevent them from killing again) but the calculus requires both a 
means of determining which murderers will be incapacitated only by execution and a 
moral standard for determining which lives should be taken in the face of recidivist 
impulses.7 As to all three theories, what is noteworthy is the scope of the traditional 
debate about whether we should execute people. It is oddly devoid of reference to 
emotion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
than deterring the defendant, which implies that it will convince him not to repeat the conduct. See Victor 
L. Streib, Death Penalty in a Nutshell 15 (2005). 
6 Although Paul Robinson and Robert Kurzban, for example, have conducted empirical studies attempting 
to measure moral intuitions about punishment. See Robinson and Kurzban (2006), Intuitions of Justice. 
7 Of course, all the aforementioned categorizations are highly oversimplified and indeed problematic. For 
example, retributive theory is sometimes characterized as utilitarian—it reaffirms the value of observing 
the law, thus creating a safer society. See e.g. Jeffrie Murphy, Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited 
(Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division , March 24, 2006). 
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Retribution 
 The omission is easiest to discern in the discourse on retributive theory. 
Retributivists “seek to punish an offender because she deserves to be punished in a 
manner commensurate to her legal wrongdoing and responsibility…Not more, not less.” 
(Markel 2004: 1439).  Retributivists struggle to explain why meting out “just deserts” is 
the proper role of the state, and how to determine what amount of punishment is just 
(Duff and Garland 1995). Some retributivists define desert as simply legal guilt, and 
others have a broader view of guilt that incorporates moral blameworthiness. (Murphy 
2006).8 Volumes have been written about these questions, and I do not intend to rehearse 
those debates here. What is interesting about standard retributivist arguments is that they 
present the need to punish the offender, as well as the ability to determine what 
punishment the offender “deserves,” as bloodless and abstract philosophical questions. 
Retributivism is often portrayed as a way to avoid or civilize emotional reactions to 
crime, a means of determining the fair and just punishment from the community’s point 
of view, rather than acquiescing to the punishment that the victim or the community 
might desire out of anger and vengeful feeling. (Markel 2004; Sigler 2000).  
 Indeed, retributivists tend to be especially eager to distance retribution from 
revenge. As Danielle Allen observes, “there is always…the worry that retribution is too 
close to revenge and is ugliness in tone, purpose and effect” (Allen 1999: 192). One 
                                                 
8 In a recent article, Paul Robinson argued that the term encompasses three separate concepts which are 
used without sufficient distinction: vengeful desert (which focuses on the harm to the victim); 
deontological desert (which focuses on the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer) and empirical desert (which 
focuses on measuring the punishment commensurate with the community’s intuitions of justice).  
Robinson, Paul H., "Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical" 
(August 17, 2006). U of Penn Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 06-32 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924917  
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defender of retributivism hastens to assure us that it “isn’t just a fancy word for revenge9 
…and is not the idea that it is good to have and satisfy {the emotion of vengefulness}.” 
(Gerstein 1974:76). A similar aversion to the concept of revenge holds sway among 
jurors voting for death. Scott Sundby reports that a large proportion of jurors he 
interviewed identified the importance of their “desire to see justice done,” though a very 
small proportion identified the importance of “feelings of revenge,” and several were 
angered by the suggestion that revenge played a role in their decisions. (Sundby 2006: 
127). He notes that similar results were found in a Gallup poll of the general population. 
(Sundby id). As Frank Zimring succinctly observed: “Vengeance is an anachronism with 
a bad press.” (Zimring 2003:58). 
 To what extent can retributivism, without reference to emotional affect, explain 
how societal or individual notions of fair and just punishment are shaped, particularly 
when the death penalty is at issue? What motivates a polity, or a community, to 
determine that the death penalty is the just desert for certain crimes?  My contention here 
is not that the institution is fueled solely by the thirst for vengeance, or that jurors who 
vote for death are motivated solely by vengeful impulses. In fact, as I will argue, the 
emotional landscape is far more complex than that. Rather, I suggest that the traditional 
debate suffers for its insufficient attention to the emotional landscape in all its 
complexity. Without attention to emotion, retributive theory becomes circular, empty and 
                                                 
9 Mary Sigler critiques Martha Nussbuam for collapsing retribution, retributivism and retributive anger. 
Sigler distinguishes retribution (a compensating reaction designed to restore the balance upset by an initial 
action) and retributivism (a theory of punishment based on the moral blameworthiness of wrongdoers, 
predicated on the assumption that the blameworthy are deserving of punishment) from retributive anger, 
which assumes anger and cruel excess. Mary Sigler, The Story of Justice: Retribution, Mercy, and the Role 
of Emotions in the Capital Sentencing Process, 19 Law and Philosophy 339, 348 n24 (2000).  
 12
indeterminate—we punish because it is the right thing to do, and we mete out the 
punishment that is right. 
 There are two separate but overlapping questions: first, why the United States—
but no other Western country, and thirty eight of the states-- but not the other twelve, 
consider the death penalty the “just desert” for certain categories of murder. Retributive 
theory has no good answer to this question. “Modern notions of desert are ordinal rather 
than cardinal.” (Robinson and Kurzban 2006). That is, they address where on the 
continuum punishment should fall, but not what types of punishment should bracket the 
continuum.10 Second, there is the question of why some jurors, in some cases, determine 
that a particular capital defendant deserves to die. Capital punishment in its ‘idealized” 
form has always assumed the existence of a group of heinous offenders, the worst of the 
worst, for whom there should be consensus that death is a just desert. Perhaps such a 
consensus could exist in theory—the “McVeigh Factor,” has become shorthand for the 
notion of crimes for which such a moral consensus might, hypothetically, come to exist  
(Sundby 2006:34; Sarat  2001:11).  However, the idealized form bears little resemblance 
to the actual decision-making process engaged in by those faced with life or death 
decisions. In practice, the decision is—and always has been-- heavily influenced by a 
host of variables unrelated to the nature and circumstances of the crime. 
 As Jeffrie Murphy recently observed (or, more accurately, characterized Nietzche 
as observing) “our abstract theorizing—at least in moral theory—cannot fully be 
                                                 
10 See Hugo A. Bedau, Retributivism and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. Phil. 601, 613 (1978): 
Although there may be little difficulty in making uniform judgments of ordinal culpability . . . or of ordinal 
harmfulness, there is no unique non-arbitrary way to combine these judgments into one judgment of ordinal 
seriousness . . . . Even if that problem is solved, and even if a plausible penalty scale can be constructed in 
terms of ordinal severity . . . there is no unique non-arbitrary way to identify the severity of the appropriate 
punishment, given only the severity of the crime . . . . 
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divorced from its social setting and from our own personal human psychology, a 
psychology that may affect us in ways of which we are not fully conscious” (Murphy:__ 
2006). Murphy’s own work, in which he unsparingly examines his evolving retributivist 
impulses, is instructive. He at one point admitted to --and indeed defended--an attitude of 
“retributive hatred,” but later became wary of the hardness and arrogance of that attitude. 
He remains a “reluctant retributivist” (Murphy 2006); the reluctance stemming from his 
awareness of the opacity of his own motives. (Murphy 1999). We should be similarly 
cautious when evaluating the fervent, frequent claim that retributivist philosophy in 
general, and retribution in sentencing in particular, are all about morality and justice, and 
not at all about emotion. 
 In contrast to standard retributivism, Robert Blecker has argued for what he terms 
emotive retributivism (Blecker 2006). He argues that the death penalty is the just and 
even obligatory punishment for certain crimes, not as a matter of undifferentiated 
vengeance, but as a means of giving voice to anger and rage toward the defendant, and to 
empathy for the victim’s suffering. He argues that “moral desert can never be reduced 
strictly to reason, nor measured adequately by rational criteria: Forgiveness, love, anger, 
resentment are part of justice.” (Blecker 2003:198). Once these emotional wellsprings of 
the legal and moral calculus are thus acknowledged, a more clear-eyed debate about 
retribution’s proper role in our capital punishment system can take place. 
 Both the retributive philosophy and the retributive impulse are better understood 
with reference to the emotional dynamics that help shape our intuitions of justice. These 
intuitions are affected by social and political context, for example by societal views of 
crime and what needs to be done to keep us safe.  The attitudes of the populace might be 
 14
better understood with reference to the constellation of emotional factors that influence 
moral reasoning (Hauser, Young and Cushman 2006; Haidt: 2001), and specifically, 
those that influence our individual and collective experience of crime, Perceptions of 
crime level and the danger posed by crime are formed in light of pre-existing templates 
about how the world works.11 The perceptions are also highly influenced by portrayals 
(for example media coverage or official pronouncements) that evoke strong emotions, 
including outrage, fear, the urge to blame, and--too often-- racial animus (Liebman 2002, 
Baldus and Woodworth 2004, Haney 2005). Indeed, as Markus Dubber argues, it is 
difficult to assess the justice of a regime of punishment without considering its ability to 
promote empathy and “counteract the natural tendency of antipathy toward the offender.” 
Dubber 2006: 117). The attitudes of individual capital jurors in particular might be better 
understood by examining all these same factors, as well as the anger, fear, compassion, 
empathy or prejudice elicited by capital defendants.  
 We might also gain a more dynamic understanding of how attitudes about what 
constitutes just punishment are communicated. Retributive theory is expressive: it 
assumes that punishment—via both its threat and its infliction--performs a signaling 
function (Markel 2004), and thus is ostensibly concerned with the communication of 
norms and norm enforcement.  Oddly, though, it pays little attention to how the signaling 
effect plays out in terms of identifying “just deserts.” It fails to address how norms are 
communicated—both to the penal institutions and their actors, and to the populace. 
 It tends to assume a static model of top-down communication in which the 
signaling effect is achieved simply by the existence and enforcement of the law on the 
                                                 
11 For an interesting treatment of the acute challenges pre-existing and preconscious assumptions (and the 
courts’ unwillingness to address them) pose in a context other than capital punishment, see Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 Harv.  J. L. & Gender 381-446 (2005). 
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books (e.g. Markel 2004: 1445).  To put it another way, it tends to assume that the 
message is communicated in a vacuum, rather than in concert with other forces which 
might amplify or distort its meaning. It is doubtful that the dynamics of signaling are ever 
that simple, but we know that in the capital context, they are much more complex. 
Attitudes toward the appropriateness of the death penalty are not developed or passed 
along in a static, top-down manner. Positions on the death penalty both draw from and 
are aimed toward a broader, more unruly, more interactive pool of knowledge and 
misinformation.  
 The standard model fails to consider, for example, the “audience effect” on the 
punishment calculus: the notion that the presence of an audience increases the measure of 
moralistic punishment (Kurzban et al 2006). This effect has been documented in the 
death penalty context, for example in studies by Stephen Bright and Patrick Keenan 
(1995) and James Liebman (2000) which found that the prospect of running for re-
election causes judges to render more—and more flawed—death sentences.12 
 The “just deserts” calculus, when the death penalty is at issue, is influenced by 
media coverage (Bandes 2004), popular cultural representations of crime (Gross 1998), 
elections and other political pressures (Kurzban 2006; Bright and Keenan 1995; Liebman 
2000), and folk knowledge (Steiner, Bowers and Sarat 2001), all of which tend to traffic 
in fear, anger and prejudice (Lipschultz & Hilt 2002, Bandes 2004). The measure of just 
punishment, in the real world of capital litigation, is taken not in a vacuum, but in light of 
intense public pressure, raw emotion and political ambition. 
                                                 
12 See also Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 
765, 788 (2002), raising concerns about whether judges subject to reelection can decide controversial cases 
without violating the due process clause, and citing Bright and Keenan’s findings. See also Freedman and 
Smith 2004: 248-49, discussing the due process issue. 
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 Emile Durkheim may be correct that our attempts to redefine the emotions 
underlying our penalogical impulses are merely cosmetic (Durkheim, 1984:46; Fisher 
and Chon: 4, 1989). At the very least, we mislead ourselves if we believe that the 
sanitized philosophical category of retribution does much work in explaining why we 
continue to execute.  
Deterrence 
 The lack of attention to emotion’s role in the debate about deterrence poses a 
different problem—how to account for the fact that those who rely on this rationale do 
not change positions when confronted with evidence that deterrence fails to work as 
advertised. Deterrence theory posits that capital punishment will dissuade others from 
committing similar crimes in the future, and that it will do so more effectively than 
alternative sentences like life imprisonment. (Carter and Kreitzberg 2004).  It is the most 
explicitly instrumental rationale for capital punishment, and the only one that makes what 
seems to be a testable empirical claim. Since capital punishment was held constitutional 
in the early 1970’s, the deterrence rationale has been—until quite recently-- the primary 
justification cited for support of the death penalty (Radelet and Borg 2000). During the 
more than three decades of the modern death penalty era, as in earlier eras (Radelet and 
Borg 2000), little support has emerged for the empirical claim on which deterrence theory 
is grounded. Studies have occasionally purported to find a deterrent effect (see e.g. 
Ehrlich 1975, 1977 and Dezbakhsh et. al. 2002), though both the methodology of such 
studies and the uses made of their findings have been harshly criticized (see e.g. 
Blumstein and Cohen 1978, critiquing Erlich; Fagan 2004, Berk 2005 and Fagan et. al 
2006, critiquing the recent spate of studies purporting to find that the death penalty 
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deters). The “empirical standoff” Justice Stewart identified in 1976 still exists. As John 
Donohue and Justin Wolfers sum up the current state of empirical knowledge: 
We are led to conclude that there exists profound uncertainty about the 
deterrent (or antideterrent) effect of the death penalty; the data tell us that 
capital punishment is not a major influence on homicide rates, but beyond 
this, they do not speak clearly. Further, we suspect that our conclusion that 
econometric studies are highly uncertain about the effects of the death penalty 
will persist for the foreseeable future.  
 
Their bottom line: “Aggregating over all of our estimates, it is entirely unclear even 
whether the preponderance of evidence suggests that the death penalty causes more or 
less murder.” (Donohue and Wolfers 2005).13 
 In short, throughout the period during which deterrence was cited as the primary 
reason to execute, there was little if any reason to believe it worked. By the late 1990’s, 
the public was becoming disenchanted with the notion of deterrence: it saw rising rates of 
execution yet did not believe crime was decreasing. Yet instead of withdrawing support 
for the death penalty, the populace simply shifted rationales. A decrease in support for the 
deterrence rationale began in the early 1990’s, and has continued since (Gross 1998). By 
2004, only one third of respondents to the Gallup Poll believed that the death penalty was 
a deterrent, compared to two thirds in 1985 (Sundby 2006: 29). Currently, “most 
Americans who favor the death penalty do so primarily for retributive reasons.” (Gross 
1998: 453).  As Sam Gross put it, “changes in the level of belief in deterrence have had 
no obvious relationship to changes in support for the death penalty.” (Gross 1998: 454). 
                                                 
13 But see Paul H. Rubin (2006). Reply to Donohue and Wolfers on the Death Penalty and Deterrence, The 
Economist’s Voice 3, available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol13/iss5/art4 (last visited June 11, 2006). 
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 Put simply, in the capital context, the stated rationale is not very closely related to 
the depth or breadth of support. If we want to learn why people support capital 
punishment, and why, contrary to Justice Marshall’s optimistic belief in the persuasive 
power of knowledge about the workings of the death penalty (Furman v. Georgia 1972), 
they do not change their position in the face of information refuting the rationale for their 
support, (Bohm et. al. 1990) we will have to look for less cognitively based 
explanations.14 Or more accurately, we need to understand how beliefs which purport to 
be cognitively based, are formed, and how, once formed, they are affected by additional 
information.  As I will discuss shortly, such an understanding requires reckoning with the 
role of emotion. 
Incapacitation 
 The incapacitation argument, when applied to the death penalty, holds that “we 
need to execute the most heinous killers in order to prevent them from killing again.” 
(Radelet and Borg 2000: 46). As one student guide put it, “Obviously, a foolproof means 
of physically preventing a specific killer from ever killing again is to take his life.” 
(Streib 2003: 15). The label “incapacitation” has an almost scientific, clinical ring to it—
it doesn’t sound angry or uncivilized, the way the term “retribution” might. The 
emotional content of this justification operates below the radar. Yet the question posed is, 
inescapably, how we take the worth of a life. How do we decide a person is so 
irredeemable, and so threatening to our future safety, that he should be cast from the 
                                                 
14 Nor does the efficacy of deterrence explain why people oppose the death penalty. As Ellsworth and 
Gross note, there are not nearly so many polls tracking the attitudes of death penalty opponents. The polls 
suggest that most opponents would continue to oppose the death penalty even if it were an effective 
deterrent. Their opposition tends to be based on the moral conviction that capital punishment is wrong, 
rather than on utilitarian considerations. (Ellsworth and Gross 1994: 19-52 ) 
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human community?15  This question draws on deeply held attitudes that are not 
cognitively based, including perceptions and fears about crime, empathy or lack of 
empathy, and beliefs about mercy, forgiveness, and adherence to rules. (Tyler and Weber 
1982; Kahan and Braman 2005). 
 In addition, as with the deterrence rationale, there is the question of whether these 
attitudes are open to reappraisal in the face of contrary evidence. Here the results are 
mixed, but the influence of emotion is clear. “Fear is one of the most prominent factors 
influencing jury decisions to impose capital sentences. Specifically, juries are fearful that 
even if they impose a sentence of life without parole, the defendant will be released and 
perhaps cause more harm.” (Bandes 2004: 595). This fear reflects both “erroneous folk 
knowledge about length of sentence” (Bandes 2004: 595; Steiner, Bowers et.al. 1999) 
and “pervasive media images of the world as a dangerous and violent place in which the 
criminal justice system has done too much for criminals and not enough to keep law-
abiding citizens safe.” (Bandes 2004: 595-96).  On a hopeful note, once erroneous beliefs 
about length of sentence are acknowledged and addressed, they appear amenable to 
correction. (Garvey, Johnson et. al. 2000). 
                                                 
15 There is a sense in which one might approach this as an empirical question, or rather two closely related 
empirical questions. The first is whether there is a class of murderers who are so dangerous, such 
committed recidivists, that if they were freed they would kill again. The second is whether execution is the 
only way, or the best way, to prevent such people from killing again. Both questions have been approached 
empirically. On the issue of recidivism, for example, a study was done to determine how many of those 
whose death sentences were commuted after Furman went on to kill again (Marquart and Sorensen 1989; 
reprinted in Bedau 1997), and it determined that only about one percent went on to kill again, about the 
same as the number later found to be innocent. (Radelet and Borg 2000: 46). On the issue of whether 
execution is necessary to incapacitate for life, there is empirical evidence that, under modern penal 
conditions and in light of the availability of life imprisonment without parole, prison is equally effective. 
(Radelet and Borg 2000: 46).  
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The Expressive Rationales Compared 
 The traditional theories of punishment have always generated unease and a sense 
that something essential about why we punish remains unexplained (Allen 1999). When 
these theories are pressed into service to explain why we execute, their limitations are 
revealed to be particularly acute. The defects of the classical theories have motivated 
“expressive” theories16 of punishment,  
under which punishment is inherently justified as a means of expressing 
symbolic defeats on wrong-doers, educating both criminals and law-abiding 
citizens, denouncing the criminal act, and communicating the content of 
society’s moral rules. (Steele 2001:36) 
 
David Garland recently observed that  
capital punishment is largely an expressive measure today, held in place 
chiefly by emotionally charged political considerations rather than by moral 
instrumental concerns such as deterrent crime control. (Garland 2005:349). 
 
 Assuming capital punishment is expressive, what does it express? Does it express 
a societal commitment to living by moral rules, (Durkheim 1984:58) the strongest 
possible condemnation of those who break the rules, (Feinberg: 1970) recognition of the 
moral worth of the victim, (Murphy and Hampton 1988) a desire to bring the victim’s 
loved ones back into the community by giving voice to their anger and grief (Allen: 
1999), the public enactment of revenge on the victim’s behalf, (Sarat 2001) reassurance 
that the world is an orderly rather than a chaotic, unsafe place, (Haney: 2006) a collective 
cry of outrage and pain, (Durkheim 1984)  the desire to purge evil from the community? 
                                                 
16 There is a rich literature about the expressive functions law serves, not only in the punishment context, 
but more generally. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 
(1996). 
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(Lifton and Mitchell 2002: 251) 17  The correct answer must be: all of the above, at least 
in some measure and at one time or another, and moreover, these expressive purposes are 
inextricably bound up with the instrumental concerns as well. The demarcation between 
traditional and expressive punishment leads us astray.  
 At the outset, I should note the confusion of the normative and descriptive that 
can muddy this debate. The traditional justifications for capital punishment are just that—
arguments for the appropriateness of capital punishment. Expressive theories are 
sometimes billed as justifications for punishment, and sometimes as better, more accurate 
accounts of why we punish. Or at times, the very label “expressive” is used as a critique, 
counterpoising emotional and political concerns against instrumental, pragmatic 
concerns. As David Garland acutely observes, this way of dividing up penological 
purposes “implies a definite ranking” between an “instrumental part…which gets things 
done” and a “symbolic part…that is merely decorative or discursive and appears to have 
no substantive function” (Garland 1990: 10).  
 The question of why the death penalty persists cannot be answered without 
reference to the expressive dimension of capital punishment. More accurately, the 
explanations are expressive all the way down. As I discussed above, retribution is 
explicitly expressive; all its benefits flow from the communication of the existence and 
implementation of punishment. Deterrence, though not often classified as such, is 
explicitly expressive as well. It is premised on the belief that would-be murderers will 
desist based on the advertised consequences to others before them. Punishment—and 
certainly capital punishment—is always a “deeply symbolic event” (Garland 1990: 10) 
                                                 
17 Another fascinating point for debate is whether these expressions are political and fluid, as David 
Garland suggests, (Garland 2005) or cultural and more deeply rooted, as Frank Zimring suggests (Zimring 
2003). 
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and we---as individuals and members of the polity—construct and understand that 
symbolism in a way that is not purely cognitive. Attitudes about whether the social order 
“requires” capital punishment, or about whether certain people “deserve” to die, or about 
which sorts of victims might be “owed” this punishment, are imbued with symbolic 
value. Moreover, they are premised on assumptions about how the world works, and how 
it ought to work. There are no “moral instrumental” concerns or purely legal justifications 
that float free of emotional and political influence, or of communicative content. And just 
as our American death penalty is an expression of culture, politics, religion and other 
values, these values are themselves intricately tied to, and in many respects a product of, 
our emotional commitments.   
The Essential Role of Emotion 
  The longstanding debate about the death penalty is intense, even polarized, 
despite (or perhaps, as I will discuss below, because of) the fact that the death penalty has 
little direct impact on most people (Ellsworth and Ross 1983). To understand why our 
society continues to support the death penalty, and whether we are likely to abandon that 
support any time soon, we must first consider how people arrive at moral judgments and 
under what conditions they will reconsider these judgments. The standard assumption, 
and certainly the bedrock legal assumption, is that people encountering a moral dilemma 
engage in moral reasoning, that this reasoning leads to a judgment, and that “emotion 
may emerge from the judgment, but is not causally related to it.” (Hauser, Young and 
Cushman 2006:6). This assumption is noteworthy both for its chain of causality and for 
its treatment of moral reasoning as individual and internal. Although there is no 
unanimity about how moral reasoning works, it is fair to say that this standard model is 
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under serious attack, particularly in light of recent findings in cognitive and social 
psychology calling its descriptive accuracy into question.  
 The phenomenon that perplexes those who study capital punishment, the 
stickiness of support for the death penalty even when the grounds for that support are 
shown to be spurious, is a nice illustration of what psychologist Jonathan Haidt calls 
“moral dumbfounding.” He noted that groups interviewed about their attitudes toward hot 
button issues: 
were often “morally dumbfounded.”; that is, they would stutter, laugh, and 
express surprise at their inability to find supporting reasons, yet they would 
not change their initial judgments…(Haidt 2001:817) 
 
This effect has been observed in numerous studies, many using neuro-imaging techniques 
like fMRI and PET scans, whose results challenge the notion that moral reasoning is the 
cause, rather than the consequence, of moral judgment. These findings have generated 
alternative models of moral reasoning. For example Haidt’s social institutionalist model 
posits that emotion triggers judgment, and that reasoning occurs after judgment, offering 
a “post-hoc rationalization of an intuitively generated response” (Haidt 2001). Another 
model, advanced by Antonio Damasio and others, posits that every moral judgment is the 
product of both emotion and reasoning (Damasio 1994), or, alternatively, that emotion is 
triggered in moral dilemmas of a personal nature, whereas reason prevails in situations of 
a more impersonal nature (Greene et al 2001; Hauser 2006). 
 One problem with discussing and interpreting such theories, particularly across 
disciplines, is the lack of any agreed upon definition for the term emotion. To say, for 
example, that moral judgments are the product of both emotion and reason is to 
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counterpoise the two terms and risk replicating an emotion/reason divide that should not 
be replicated (Bandes 1999). This is not the proper place for an abstract discussion of this 
age-old problem, and as I argued earlier, a more complex understanding of the role of 
emotion renders the divide far less pronounced. For current purposes, an examination of 
the ways in which attitudes toward the death penalty are shaped will help illustrate both 
the malleability of the terms and the application of the moral reasoning debate to the 
question at hand. 
 If we categorize “deterrence” and “retribution” and “incapacitation” as reasons 
for supporting the death penalty, and “fear” “forgiveness” and “outrage” as emotions that 
hijack the reasoning process, we will likely conclude, with the social scientists who have 
studied the matter, that “most people’s attitudes toward capital punishment are basically 
emotional. The ‘reasons’ are determined by the attitude, not the reverse.” (Ellsworth and 
Gross 1994: 95). But if this conclusion implies that there is a realm of “pure reason” that 
could operate if only we could cordon off the emotions that continually interfere, then it 
should be approached with caution. Instead, social and emotional concerns are an 
inextricable part of the reasoning process itself.  
 Emotion affects our evaluation of capital punishment at the most basic level. Our 
pre-existing attitudes18 about how the world works affect our beliefs about particular 
issues. Indeed, particularly when the attitudes are deeply held, they protect our beliefs 
from contradictory or threatening information. They affect the way we process and 
evaluate information. They affect whether we even consider new information, what 
                                                 
18  Attitude is sometimes defined as “the psychological predisposition or tendency to respond to an entity 
with a positive or negative evaluation.” (Herek 2004: 17). Dan Kahan refers to what he calls “cultural 
commitments,” (Kahan 2006: 148) and others refer to “implicit theories” (Dweck et al. 1995: 276.) These 
terms generally refer to the same concept: templates about how the world works and how people behave, 
not necessarily consciously held. 
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category we assign it to, how much importance we give it, and how much we care about 
it. Research on motivated reasoning has shown that when people become aroused-- i.e. 
motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion or to support a particular belief-- they begin 
screening out contrary information at a very early stage. They search memory for beliefs, 
heuristics and rules that support their desired conclusion, but they do not realize that they 
are engaging in a biased process. They attempt to construct a persuasive rationale for 
their desired conclusion, so that it looks, even to them, as if they are engaging in an open 
minded process of reasoning (Kunda 1990: 495). Hence Haidt’s “moral dumfoundedness 
effect”: people are resistant to information that contradicts their pre-existing attitudes and 
often turn away such information at an early stage, but they are not conscious that they 
are doing this. (Kunda 1990: 490, Bandes 2006, Burke 2006). 
 For example, how should the question of whether the death penalty is an effective 
deterrent be approached? It requires some notion of how people will behave when faced 
with the threat of draconian (and, in most cases uncertain) consequences. It also requires 
a sense of whether the draconian consequence of taking a life is called for. In order to 
answer these questions, people draw—intuitively or consciously—on their attitudes about 
how the world works. For example, some people see others as possessing fixed, 
unchanging moral traits; some see others’ moral traits as malleable and dynamic (Dweck 
1995: 276). These assumptions about character and behavior will likely influence one’s 
assessment of whether people can change their behavior in the face of threatened 
consequences (Blumenthal 2006). Then there is the question of what sorts of people one 
might imagine when thinking about whether would-be murderers learn by example. What 
sorts of people are in the category of would-be murderers? (Osofsky et. al. 2005: 375) 
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Are they people for whom we might feel empathy or forgiveness, or evil, irredeemable 
people, or people from a different demographic world—one which may evoke hostility, 
fear or prejudice? Moreover, the question of whether the “ultimate” deterrent is necessary 
implicates emotion laden attitudes about criminality, how it affects our safety, and how 
our safety might be best safeguarded. How fearful are we about the world around us? 
Does it feel chaotic and scary? Are we outraged by the government’s failure to protect us, 
and would we feel reassured if something visible and punitive were being done? What are 
our attitudes toward law enforcement—trusting, deferential, or concerned about fallibility 
and corruption? Each of us shows up for the general debate with a world view, and this 
world view is emotional as well as cognitive. 
 Ellsworth and Ross found that attitudes toward the death penalty were 
emotionally based, and preceded, rather than stemmed from, reasoned beliefs, so that, for 
example, while “a belief in the relative deterrent efficacy of capital punishment is almost 
perfectly correlated with support for it…this belief cannot be considered a major reason 
for this support” (Ellsworth and Ross 1983: 162). Tom Tyler and Renee Weber, in a 
study seeking to measure whether support for the death penalty was instrumental or 
symbolic, concluded that “political and social attitudes are the major source of beliefs 
concerning the retributive value, deterrence value, and humanity of the death penalty.” 
(Tyler and Weber 1982:41). They argued that the attitudes affecting death penalty 
support are basic, highly affective, pre-cognitive attitudes toward the world, such as 
liberalism, authoritarianism and dogmatism. These attitudes precede the formation of 
beliefs about particular issues, for example beliefs about the value of retribution or 
deterrence, and the beliefs that develop will support the initially formed attitudes (id). 
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 Tyler and Weber conclude that support for the death penalty is symbolic rather 
than instrumental. I draw a different lesson from these studies: that the distinction 
between the symbolic and the instrumental is not descriptively useful in this context. The 
way we view the world will affect both our notions of the efficacy of instrumental 
punishments and our sense of what punishment ought to express. In other words, those 
who support the death penalty will both think it works and agree with its symbolic 
message. For example, for those who see the world in terms of individual responsibility 
and deference to authority, the death penalty may seem to be a practical deterrent, and 
also a proper symbol; an expression of the strongest possible condemnation of deviant 
behavior. Those whose world view encompasses concerns with racial inequality or 
societal causes of crime are likely question the death penalty’s ability to deter, and to 
disapprove of its symbolic repudiation of the possibility of forgiveness and redemption. 
(Kahan 2006: 157). The death penalty serves, always, as both a concrete policy and an 
abstract symbol—either of toughness, control and certainty, or of inequality, vengeance 
and irreversible error. It projects a set of values, and to the extent those values are 
emotionally resonant, and consonant with the values of the population, it is viewed as 
legitimate (Baldus and Woodworth 2004: 1427; Zimring 2003: 127). 
The Feedback Loop 
 The emotional resonance that permits the death penalty to maintain its aura of 
legitimacy is a dynamic, interactional emotional state. The view of emotion as private 
and internal is a barrier to understanding a process that in fact takes shape in a social and 
cultural context19 (Hochschild 1983). Emotion exists in a complex feedback loop with 
                                                 
19 Recently, albeit more than two decades after the publication of her landmark work The Managed Heart, 
the field of sociology has taken up Arlie Hochschild’s challenge to consider emotion in dynamic, 
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institutions like the justice system. It has a role in shaping our institutions, and the 
institutions in turn have a role in shaping emotions—their expression, their display, and 
even, arguably, their inchoate nature. As Martha Nussbaum argues, we construct 
institutions that embody what we value (Nussbaum 2001: 405). The continued existence 
of the death penalty is a societal declaration that death is the appropriate punishment for 
the most terrible crimes. This declaration rests on a complex and evolving 
legal/moral/emotional judgment about what we require in order to restore the sense of 
order and justice that are disturbed by a heinous crime. Thus, over the years, it has been 
possible to chart shifts, not only in public attitudes toward capital punishment, but in the 
emotional content and the emotional rhetoric of those attitudes.20  For example, where 
once it was considered harsh and unenlightened to rely on retributive theory in support of 
the death penalty, in recent years it has become acceptable and common. As David 
Garland put it,  
the background affect of policy is now more frequently a collective anger and 
a righteous demand for retribution than a commitment to a just, socially 
engineered solution. The emotional temperature of policymaking has shifted 
from cool to hot. (Garland 2001:10-11).  
 
 At the same time, the language of emotion and therapy has become welcome in 
the courtroom, as acknowledging the worth of victims and providing a forum for 
“closure” and healing to their survivors have become central goals of capital punishment 
                                                                                                                                                 
institutional contexts, as exciting new work addresses the sociology of emotions. See e.g. Turner and Stets 
2005. 
20 See, for example, V.A. C. Gatrell’s The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Randall McGowen, A Powerful Sympathy: Terror, the 
Prison, and Humanitarian Reform in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain (1986) The Journal of British 
Studies 25, 312-334, discussing the shifts in the emotional meaning of public execution—and in the 
evolution in “public emotion” generally, in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain.  
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(Zimring 2003: 57-63, Bandes 1996, Bandes 2000). These institutional goals play a role 
in shaping emotions, by creating a set of emotional expectations that must be responded 
to. For example, the existence of the penalty has created an expectation that only capital 
punishment will truly honor the dignity and worth of the victim. This expectation has 
serious consequences. Despite the recommendations of numerous blue ribbon 
commissions to narrow the list of death eligible crimes, legislators come under pressure 
to expand the list in order to demonstrate the value of the lives of the victims in each 
category. As Scott Turow observed: “the fundamental equality of each survivor’s loss 
creates an inevitable emotional momentum to expand the categories for death penalty 
eligibility.”  (Turow 2003) Prosecutors routinely assure jurors that a death sentence is 
owed to the victim and the victims’ survivors. Thus jurors are signaled that death is the 
default sentence, and that failure to impose it betrays the dead and the bereaved. Family 
members and other survivors of murder victims are encouraged to feel that they are 
entitled to a death sentence, and even that the failure to impose a death sentence is an 
additional infliction of pain they must bear.21 
  The trial court has been drafted into a therapeutic role, without much thought for 
whether it can or should serve that purpose (Henderson: 1985). Based on the questionable 
concept of closure, survivors22 are assured that the execution will at last allow them to 
move on with their lives (Lithwick 2006). Survivors have also been assured that only a 
                                                 
21 For more extensive discussion of the role of victims and the concept of closure in capital cases, see 
Bandes 1996 and Bandes 2000. 
22 The question of who should be treated as a survivor for this purpose is sometimes complex, and never 
more so than in prosecutions for mass murder. See, for example, Wayne Logan’s discussion of the use of 
victim impact testimony in the sentencing hearing of Zacharias Moussaoui for his role in the September 
11th attacks. As Logan recounts, the court permitted former mayor Rudolph Guliani and others to testify to 
the impact of the murders on institutional victims like the New York Police Department and the City of 
New York, a decision which greatly upset some of those who lost close relatives in the attack (Logan 
2006.) 
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death sentence can heal their wounds, and efforts to truncate the appellate process have 
been premised on the survivors’ need to attain closure (Bandes 2000, Zimring 2003: 57-
63). 
 Thus the feedback loop perpetuates itself. We have the system we think we need, 
and it drives us to need the system we have. But the story is complicated. As Frank 
Zimring points out, the death penalty died in Western Europe despite broad popular 
support. It was abolished by those in leadership positions, and yet its abolition did not 
create an outcry from the populace (Zimring 2003: 22-24; Lifton and Mitchell 2002: 
247). It seems unlikely, at least in today’s political climate, that U.S. leaders could (or 
would) play the same role,23 and the reason is not so much the breadth of American 
support for the death penalty, but the intensity of the support. The differences between 
the European and American approaches to capital punishment raise complex historical, 
political and social questions which scholars like James Q. Whitman (Whitman 2003), 
Garland, Lifton, Zimring and others have considered in depth, and which cannot be 
considered in detail here. My contention is that emotion theory, and particularly the role 
of salience, help illuminate the sources of that intensity, as well as a possible way to 
move the conversation forward. 
Salience 
 Salience is a term in technical use in psychology, neuroscience, semiotics and 
other disciplines. Although there are variations in meaning across and even within these 
                                                 
23 Taking a strong position against the death penalty is generally a surefire recipe for political suicide. See 
e.g. Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man at 80, The Atlantic Monthly, November 1999 (“it is highly implausible 
that a candidate who refused to take a strong position in favor of the death penalty {in a judicial election 
race} could be elected”). See also Bandes 2004: 595-96; Kropf 2006 (quoting William W. Wilkins, chief 
judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, as saying “No one {in South Carolina} can be elected to 
statewide office who is opposed to the death penalty.”) 
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disciplines, the term generally refers to the accessibility, intensity, or attention-getting 
properties of an event or other entity, and so I will use it here (see e.g. Yen and Finkel 
2002). Salience is key to understanding the role emotion plays in decision-making. 
Emotion “acts as a great emphasizer and highlighter in the brain, an indicator of 
importance and urgency” (Goodenough and Prehn 2004: 1717). It helps determine what 
we will keep in the forefront of consciousness and what will drive us to act; e.g. what is 
salient. Salience is key to understanding—and perhaps changing-- both the societal and 
individual dynamics that have led to the persistence of capital punishment in the United 
States.  
 A unique aspect of the death penalty debate is the strange confluence between the 
broad intense public debate on the topic and the lack of personal exposure to the capital 
system. As Ellsworth and Gross observed: 
Capital punishment is an issue that is far removed from most people’s direct 
experience. Few Americans have ever sat in the jury box or the dock in a 
capital case, or spent much time with condemned prisoners, or known a victim 
well. And yet most people have opinions about capital punishment that are 
strong, definite, and difficult to change (Ellsworth and Gross 1994: 161). 
 
 The intensity of public opinion on the topic is significant for a number of reasons. 
As we saw above, people often engage in motivated reasoning that leads them to ward off 
any information threatening to their beliefs. They go to great lengths to reaffirm what 
they “know,” turning away conflicting specialized knowledge or subjecting it to different 
or higher standards of accuracy (Bohm, Clark and Aveni 1990:181). As one researcher 
put it, subjects would “twirl the emotional kaleidoscope until it gave them a picture that 
was comfortable.” (Vedantam: 2006). People do not always reason this way, and in some 
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cases they can be primed to strive for accuracy and therefore to remain open to new 
information. Motivated reasoning might be triggered by the need to feel good about, or 
reduce cognitive dissonance about, one’s own actions and choices. Significantly, it might 
also arise from a desire to cling to strongly felt pre-existing beliefs about the world, even 
in situations that do not directly impinge upon one’s life. It is not surprising that this 
effect has been observed in the capital punishment context (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979; 
Baldus and Woodworth 2004: 1431), a context in which Americans do not merely hold 
opinions, they “care a great deal” (Ellsworth and Gross 1994: 161). 
The intensity of belief contributes not only to the solidifying (or ossifying) of  
individual opinion, but to the polarization of group opinion. As Kahan and Braman 
observe, “the tendency of individuals to trust only those who share their orientation 
makes the belief-generative power of culture feed on itself.” (Kahan and Braman 2006: 
154). Particularly with the sorts of symbolic, hot button issues that are “strongly 
connected to an individual’s cultural identity,” (Kahan and Braman 2006:164) the effect 
of additional information is often, perversely, to reinforce the chasm between opposing 
groups.  
 The deeply held feelings underlying the debate may be essential to understanding 
how the United States got left behind as most of the industrialized world moved toward 
abolition. As Zimring argues, although the top-down policy change in Western European 
countries did not much affect the breadth of support for the death penalty in those 
countries, it also did not provoke the backlash that would likely occur in the U.S., in 
which the popular investment in the policy is much stronger (Zimring 2003: 127; see also 
Whitman 2003: 15). 
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 The mix of intense emotional investment in the issue, polarization, and lack of 
exposure to the facts on the ground is lethal. The conversation might begin couched in 
terms of deterrence or retribution, it might move to broader attitudinal claims about 
federalism, vigilantism, and crime control, but it does not take long to get to the ultimate 
polarized place, in which one side is arguing for purging the society of evil and the other 
side is calling the first side evil for advocating murder. At that level of high stakes 
abstraction, the prospects for nuanced conversation are bleak. 
 At this pass, salience is again relevant; indeed, it may offer the way out of the 
stalled conversation. At one level, the highly abstract conversation is peculiarly sensitive 
to high profile events and trends. It has long been shaped by perceptions of violent crime, 
such as those driven by constant, sensationalized images of random, racialized violence 
(Haney 2005; Bandes 2004). It has been fueled by certain high visibility crimes, 
particularly the Oklahoma City bombings, which provided Timothy McVeigh, the poster 
boy for capital punishment. But it has also worked the other way, responding to the 
occasional high profile execution of a sympathetic person, for example Karla Faye 
Tucker, and to high profile exonerations like that of Rolando Cruz. These cases have 
elicited an accessible set of countervailing moral imperatives. The DNA exoneration 
cases in particular have been effective in part because they provide vivid, easy to grasp 
illustrations of the unfairness and immorality of executing someone who has been 
scientifically shown to be innocent.24 Lifton and Mitchell argue that it was just this sort of 
                                                 
24 However, the Supreme Court has been highly reluctant to recognize claims of actual innocence, or to 
ease the procedural barriers to their recognition. See e.g. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (creating 
high bar for habeas petitioners seeking to avoid procedural default through claim of actual innocence) and 
Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (creating extraordinarily high bar for habeas petitioners seeking to 
raise freestanding claims of actual innocence). Most recently, in Bell v. House, 539 U.S. 937 (2003), the 
Court appeared to suggest that the lower courts had been a bit too demanding in their application of the 
Schlup standard. Yet the Court declined to find the Herrara standard met in that case, despite recognizing 
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moral outrage over individual miscarriages of justice that helped pave the way for 
abolition in some Western European countries (Lifton and Mitchell 2002: 248). 
 But the exoneration cases illustrate a difference, more nuanced point about 
salience. People are often able to pierce or move beyond abstractions when confronted 
with actual human lives in all their complex, messy concreteness. This is one well-known 
finding of the “trolley” experiments25 examining the cognitive mechanisms that affect 
moral decision-making. We approach a moral dilemma quite differently if we experience 
it as directly affecting us or those we care about (Greene, et. al.2001). This difference has 
enormous significance for the death penalty on both the individual and societal levels.  
 One of the most important characteristics of the capital trial is the insistent 
message that the issue of whether the defendant should live or die is not an emotional 
issue. The very appearance of dispassionate process is an important part of the system’s 
emotional landscape; a powerful implicit message to the jury as well as the other legal 
actors (Haney1997). In numerous ways the message is conveyed: You are not making a 
profoundly disturbing ethical choice about the taking of a life. You are not directly 
responsible for the taking of a life; you are just one link in a complex chain. That is, the 
conditions needed for moral disengagement are created, including the sanitizing of the 
decision to kill, and the diffusion of responsibility for the decision (Haney 1997; 
                                                                                                                                                 
that it was is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have lacked a reasonable doubt of the 
suspect’s guilt had they been privy to the now-available DNA evidence.  See also Susan Bandes, Simple 
Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 Buffalo Law Review 537 (1996). See 
also Shaw, Wrong on Wrongful Executions, contradicting Justice Scalia’s recent claim in his concurrence 
in Kansas v. Marsh  that there has not be “a single case—not one—in which it is clear that a person was 
executed for a crime he did not commit.” Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2533 (2006). 
25 These are artificial dilemmas, whose parameters can be manipulated, which are designed to test the 
dynamics of moral judgment.  One well known study concluded that those dilemmas experienced as 
personal affected different areas of the brain and led to different moral reasoning processes from those 
experienced as impersonal. Greene, Joshua D., Sommerville, R. Brian, Nystrom, Leigh E., Darley, John M. 
and Cohen, Jonathan D., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment (2001). 
Science 293, 2105-   But see Hauser (2006) (questioning whether the impersonal/personal dichotomy 
explains results of studies.) 
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Osofsky, et al 2005). But jurors confronted with wrenching cases often find this 
dispassion and detachment impossible to attain. Scott Sundby quotes one such juror as 
saying “You develop all these theories about the death penalty and the criminal justice 
system, but being in it is different. You come to grips with what you really think and 
feel” (Sundby 2005: 171). Alex Kotlowitz described how a jury of men and women who 
strongly favored the death penalty as an abstract matter came to spare the life of Jeremy 
Gross, a capital defendant whom they had convicted of a brutal murder. He recounts how 
the jury, learning about Gross’s own brutal childhood, gradually came to understand him 
and even to empathize with various aspects of his life. At first, jurors could not look him 
in the eye, and they adjudged him to be cold and indifferent. As they got to know more 
about him, they reread his demeanor, viewing what they initially thought was 
indifference to be shame. Their empathetic connection was crucial to their eventual 
decision to spare him (Kotlowitz  2002). 
 Making the stakes concrete will not always work against the death penalty. 
Prosecutors use victim impact statements, for example, to make the victim’s suffering 
salient and thereby encourage a death sentence.26 Nevertheless, defense attorneys 
understand how crucial it is that juries hear the more elusive counter-narrative of the 
defendant’s humanity; and that they do not distance themselves from the defendant’s 
pain, the possibility of his redemption, and their own responsibility in determining his 
fate (Bandes 1996).  
                                                 
26 The Moussaoui verdict was interesting in this regard. Moussaoui is the only person yet to be tried in a 
U.S. courtroom for the September 11th attacks. More than three dozen family members of those killed in the 
attacks gave victim impact testimony. The jury (which was reportedly quite divided on the issue) did not 
sentence Moussaoui to death, partly because of lingering doubt about his role in the plot. As the New York 
Times put it, “The Moussaoui jury acted as capital juries typically do. It accepted the government’s 
argument in the abstract, but, when push came to shove, it stopped short of sending the defendant to his 
death.” Adam Liptak, Moussaoui Verdict Highlights Where Juries Fear to Tread, The New York Times as 
A21 (May 5, 2006). 
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 As Scott Sundby recently observed, the death penalty might die because of a sea 
change, or because of a “death by a thousand cuts” (Sundby 2006). Either scenario 
depends on piercing the veil of abstraction. There is ample evidence that the death 
penalty is at its most desirable when at its most abstract and symbolic. When people are 
confronted with concrete information about actual defendants,27 the mechanics of lethal 
injection or other execution methods, or alternatives like life without parole, support for 
the death penalty lessens considerably (Haney 2005: 90). As Lifton and Mitchell put it:  
people embrace the principle as a psychological source of security—which 
turns out to be fragile because it is readily threatened by whatever reminds 
them that execution is a form of killing (Lifton and Mitchell 2002: 252). 
 
Concluding Thoughts: Claiming the Emotional Terrain 
 The debate about the death penalty is too often conducted in parallel rhetorical 
worlds. The traditional discussion about the purposes of punishment is based on 
assumptions about what count as legally and philosophically rigorous grounds for 
punishment. It divides up the world in a way that relegates certain concerns to the 
devalued realm of the decorative, the symbolic, the emotional, and views this realm as 
soft and illegitimate. When legal scholars, jurists and social scientists participate in the 
discussion on such terms, they become demoralized by the disconnect between “proper” 
reasons and the actual dynamics of the death penalty. I suggest that this disconnect is in 
part based on a misunderstanding about the role of emotion in the reasoning process. As I 
have often argued, the idea that emotion pervades the law poses a threat to law’s most 
                                                 
27 Or, for that matter, actual victims and survivors, some of whom do not want the death penalty. Bandes 
(1996) and Bandes (2000).  The voices of victims are sometimes suppressed in capital sentencing hearings 
when they do not advance the prosecution agenda. For example, in the sentencing hearing of Timothy 
McVeigh, the prosecution barred testimony by the mother of a child killed in the Oklahoma City bombing 
because she opposed the death penalty (Bandes 1999: 341).  
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cherished self conception. Unfortunately, to ward off that idea is simply to perpetuate and 
insulate the current emotional landscape; not to banish emotion from the legal process. In 
the conventional view, opposition to capital punishment is often denigrated as emotional 
and moral, and therefore lacking in the rationality and tough-mindedness the law 
requires. Yet those who support the death penalty tend to be driven by passion as well, a 
passion that is not fueled by legal, doctrinal concerns. The current system of capital 
punishment is rife with fear, anger, selective empathy, blame, and the desire for revenge; 
all clothed or camouflaged in the language of rational legality. To avoid the discussion is 
simply to cede the ground.  
 We can allow ourselves to be borne along on waxing and waning emotional 
tides—fears, panics, and sympathies—or we can address the emotional issues directly.  
Arguably the direct approach proved quite successful for the pro-capital punishment 
camp; the emotional meaning of capital punishment evolved noticeably in the face of the 
victims’ rights movement. When the deterrence rationale began to lose force, the new 
language of therapeutic healing and closure provided a way to maintain support without 
facing the ugly question of how much retribution resembles revenge.  
 The death penalty thrives under a set of rules, explicit and implicit, about what 
sorts of emotions can be displayed and even experienced in the legal arena. These rules 
encourage moral disengagement and discourage empathy. They keep the concrete reality 
of the death penalty at a safe remove. Most of those who support the death penalty do so 
in the abstract. Their support often wanes when they become viscerally aware of the fact 
that capital punishment involves the killing of human beings. Certain realities need to be 
made salient: the humanity and individuality of each capital defendant, the horror of the 
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execution itself, and the fact that each of us is implicated in and responsible for each 
execution and for the system that facilitates state-sponsored killing. These realities are at 
the moral and emotional center of the American system of capital punishment, and they 
should be at the center of the debate about its fate. They should incite passion and 
commitment. When that happens on a broad scale, the death penalty will die its well-
deserved death. 
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